Jail time credit, 46-18-403(2)

DA 07-0120
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2008 MT 344
STATE OF MONTANA, v. RANDY ALLEN DENNISON,
1. Did the District Court exceed its sentencing authority by imposing conditions on Dennison’s parole?
2. Did the District Court err by imposing a total fine of $28,850 against Dennison?
Pursuant to § 46-18-403(2), MCA, a person may be granted credit on a fine for each day of incarceration prior to conviction, except that the amount credited may not exceed the amount of the fine. Here, neither the $27,750 credit given by the District Court nor the 555 days of time served at $50 per day upon which it was based is challenged on appeal.
¶22 Remanded with instructions that the District Court enter an amended judgment deleting all reference to conditions of parole and reinstating its 2006 total fine of $9,200, less credit for time served, for a net fine of $0.

No contempt for failing to pay fines

1979
No. 14786
THE STATE OF MONTANA, v.
JAMES LENIHAN,
1. Is the issue raised by defendant properly reviewable
on appeal?
2. Did the District Court err in ordering an indigent
defendant to reimburse the county for attorney fees as part
of a condition of deferred imposition of sentence
"No convicted person may be held in contempt for
failure to repay if he shows that his default was not attributable
to an intentional refusal to obey the order of the
court or to a failure on his part to make a good faith
effort to make the payment." Fuller v. Oregon, 40 L.Ed.2d at
650.

This Court is aware of the financial burden placed on the counties and the State by the criminal justice system.
We do not disagree with the proposition of reimbursement to the State. On the contrary, we applaud the trial judge for his efforts. However, we feel that recoupment provisions should be made to operate with considerations given to ability to repay, and in the event of default, the penalty should be a form of civil liability rather than possible criminal sanctions. Recoupment is not a magic word, and it may be possible and desirable to perfect a system outside
that kind of legislation.
The judgment of the deferred imposition of sentence is remanded to the District Court with instructions to vacate the repayment of attorney fees condition complained of and enter its order accordingly.

Fines

No. 92-552 1994
STATE OF MONTANA,
v. THOMAS NEIL SULLIVAN,

1. Did the District Court err in failing to hold an omnibus
hearing at least 30 days prior to trial pursuant to g 46-13-110,
MCA, thereby prejudicing defendant?
2. Did prejudicial media publicity, and the District Court's
refusal to grant challenges for cause, preclude a fair trial for
defendant?
3. Did the District Court err by limiting the testimony of
Sue Duarte, excluding the testimony of Richard Duarte, and failing
to grant defendant's motion for a mistrial?
4. Did the District Court err in refusing to dismiss or
reverse Counts I, 111, IV, and V of the information on the grounds
of insufficiency of evidence?
5. Did the District Court err in fining defendant his
vacation pay and sick leave pay and ordering distribution of these
funds to United Way of Cascade County?
We reverse and remand this part of the judgment for further proceedings in accordance with 9 46-18-603, MCA, which provides :
All fines and forfeitures collected in any court except
city courts must be applied to the payment of the costs of the case in which the...[[

Jail time credit, illegal sentence

2003 MT 33
STATE OF MONTANA,v.
MICHAEL D. FISHER,
The issue presented for review is whether § 46-18-403, MCA, requires that a
sentencing court give a defendant credit for time incarcerated prior to conviction against both his jail sentence and any fine imposed.
We hold that a sentencing court has no discretion in applying § 46-18-403, MCA. It
must employ both subsections and give the defendant credit for each day of incarceration against both the sentence and any fine imposed. Once a valid sentence has been pronounced, the sentencing court has no jurisdiction to modify it except to correct factual errors. Section 46-18-116(3), MCA; Brown v. State, 2002 MT 209N, . However, a sentence which does not comply with Montana statutory law is illegal and must be addressed in the manner provided by law for appeal and postconviction relief. Section 46-18-116(3), MCA.
As we did in Layzell, we reverse and remand for resentencing in accordance with
this opinion.

Illegal "Assesments" at sentencing

The District Court erred in sentencing Krum to pay “assessments” of $5,000 to the Park County Court Automation Fund, $2,500 to the Tri-County Network for Domestic Violence, and $2,500 to Park County Big Brothers and Sisters. These assessments were made without statutory authority, and as such, are illegal. Thus, we reverse and remand with instructions to strike the illegal portion of the sentence.