Santobello Error

2008 MT 201
STATE OF MONTANA,v.
DUSTIN DUMONT RAHN,
The dispositive issue is whether the District Court abused its discretion in ruling the State of Montana did not breach the plea agreement.
Allowing the State to make a “miscarriage of justice” argument on remand via Sullivan’s letter and testimony—the very evidence by which it breached the plea agreement—would itself be a miscarriage of justice, because it would effectively deny Rahn any remedy for the State’s breach.
Reversed and remanded for resentencing by a different judge consistent with this opinion.

Santobello error - breached plea agreement, specific performance

2001 MT 85
STATE OF MONTANA,v.
DANIEL MUNOZ,

Upon remand, does Munoz have the right to choose the remedy, either specific
performance of the agreement or the right to withdraw his guilty plea, due to the State's breach of the plea agreement.
Further, the state has failed to present one compelling reason why this choice should not rest in the hands of the defendant. Rather, the State focusses squarely and repeatedly on its preferred scenario here, that specific performance is appropriate because the sentencing court is not bound by the State's recommendation--inferring that although the State concededly breached and may be ordered to "perform," Munoz should not be afforded any remedy. We view this particular posture as unpersuasive in light of the "fundamental rights" that are "flouted" by a prosecutor's breach of a plea bargain. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 267, 92 S.Ct. at 501 (Douglas, J., concurring).
We conclude that, in light of the underlying principles of contract law, a nonbreaching defendant must be afforded the initial right to choose from available remedies where the State breaches a plea agreement. The State must therefore bear the substantial burden, as the breaching party, of demonstrating with clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's choice of remedy would result in a miscarriage of justice. Only upon such a showing may a district court, in its discretion, disallow a defendant's choice of remedy. To the limited extent that our prior decisions in Persak and Rardon conflict with our holding here today, we overrule those cases. We hold that upon remand, Munoz should be granted his chosen remedy of withdrawal of his guilty plea.
Accordingly, we reverse.

Breached Plea Agreement

No. 00-844
STATE OF MONTANA
2002 MT14
STATE OF MONTANA,v
JAMES AFTERBUFFALO.
The issue on appeal is whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying
Afterbuffalo's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
We conclude, therefore, that the District Court's additional requirement that Afterbuffalo be placed in either a prerelease or intensive supervision program was outside the scope of the plea agreement and constitutes a rejection by the court of the agreement. As a result, we further conclude that, pursuant to § 46-12-211(4), MCA, the District Court was required to allow Afterbuffalo to withdraw his guilty plea.
We hold that the District Court abused its discretion in denying Afterbuffalo's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.