Defendants’ rights violated by the warrantless electronic monitoring and recording of

2008 MT 296
STATE OF MONTANA, No. 05-676
v.
MICHAEL THADDEUS GOETZ,
Were the Defendants’ rights under Article II, Sections 10 and 11 of the Montana Constitution violated by the warrantless electronic monitoring and recording of their one-on-one conversations with confidential informants, notwithstanding the confidential informants’ consent to the monitoring?
The electronic monitoring and recording of those conversations without a warrant or the existence of an established exception to the warrant requirement violated the Defendants’ rights under Article II, Sections 10 and 11. As a result, we hold the District Court erred in denying the Defendants’ motions to suppress evidence derived from the warrantless electronic monitoring and recording of the three conversations at issue on the basis that the activities at issue did not constitute searches.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Ineffective assistance of counsel

008 MT 193
WILLIAM M. HALLEY,
v.
STATE OF MONTANA,
Did the District Court err in denying Halley’s Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

In the case before us, the District Court abused its discretion in failing to comply with the Gallagher guidelines when presented with a claim of ineffective counsel and a request for substitute counsel. It further erred in failing to inquire adequately whether Halley’s waiver of his right to counsel and request to represent himself was voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made.
As a result, the District Court’s Opinion and Order Denying Petitioner’s Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is based on incorrect conclusions of law.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Halley’s guilty pleas, reverse the District Court’s denial of his petition, and remand this matter for retrial.

Social workers testimony of amphetamine use error

DA 06-0565
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2008 MT 274
STATE OF MONTANA, v. CLYDE WILLIAM HAYDEN, SR.
Issue 1: Did the District Court err by not striking DPHHS social worker Elizabeth Foster’s testimony that Hayden had a positive urinalysis test for methamphetamine and by not giving an instruction that such testimony must be disregarded?
Issue 2: Was it plain error to admit testimony that witnesses were telling the truth in their initial statements; and did the prosecutor commit plain error in his statements concerning witness credibility and his opinion of the quality of police work?
The District Court did not abuse its discretion by not striking the testimony regarding Hayden’s methamphetamine use. However, Hayden’s constitutional right to a fair trial was undermined by plain error. Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

sex offender law

PState v. Lee
306 Mont. 173, 31 P.3d 998
Mont.,2001.
Under the present circumstances, we conclude that due process requires the trial court to consider whether there were adequate alternatives to incarceration that would further the purpose of Lee's suspended sentence. This is especially true when, as in Nixon, Lee's failure to complete sex offender treatment as required by the terms of his sentence was due not to his wilful conduct, but rather was due to the actions of the State. To do otherwise would deprive Lee of his conditional freedom simply because the State prevented him from completing sex offender treatment while imprisoned. Accordingly, we remand to the District Court to determine whether there are any reasonable alternative measures, other than continued incarceration, that are adequate to meet the State's interest in Lee's punishment, deterrence, or rehabilitation.
Reversed and remanded.