The offender may not be prosecuted, however, based only on the breach of the condition itself. Williams v. State, 528 A.2d 507, 510 (Md. App. 1987) (h

STATE v. LETASKY DA 06-0149 2007 MT 51 2/23/2007

TheThe offender may not be prosecuted, however, based only on the breach of the condition itself.

Williams v. State, 528 A.2d 507, 510 (Md. App. 1987) (holding a condition of probation may be enforced only through the power to revoke the probation, not through contempt proceedings). Montana Code indicates that the legislature did not intend for criminal contempt to be available as a remedy when an offender violates a condition of his suspended sentence.

The legislature did not list criminal contempt in § 46-18-203(7), MCA,
We reverse and remand with instructions for the District Court to dismiss Letasky’s charge of misdemeanor criminal contempt.

“irreconcilable conflict”

o. 04-429
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2007 MT 49
STATE OF MONTANA,
JAMES RALPH HENDERSHOT, III,

The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the District Court abused its discretion in refusing Hendershot’s request for new counsel.
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the District Court abused its discretion in refusing Hendershot’s request for new counsel.

Guilty plea withdraw

STATE v. FRAZIER

DA 06-0271

2007 MT 40

2/13/2007

The Justice Court’s interrogation was inadequate to determine whether there was

any factual basis for Frazier’s guilty plea. Since any doubts as to whether a plea was
voluntary should be resolved in favor of the defendant, we hold that the District Court erred by not allowing Frazier to withdraw his guilty plea. Therefore, we reverse and remand this matter to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Right of self incrimination violated

STATE v. RENNAKER DA 06-0105 2007 MT 10 1/23/2007

This Court held that a district court is prohibited from “augmenting a defendant’s sentence because he refuses to confess to a crime or invokes his privilege against self-incrimination.” Imlay, 249 Mont. at 91, 813 P.2d at 985.We noted that a district court can consider lack of remorse as a basis for a sentence, but cannot punish a defendant for refusal to admit guilt. Shreves, ¶ 19 Here, the District Court did not tie its finding of lack of remorse to any specific evidence or statements made by Rennaker. Rather, it violated Rennaker’s right against self-incrimination when, based on Rennaker’s silence, it drew a negative inference of lack of remorse.

Beautiful Loser

STATE v. LEWIS 05-619 2007 MT 16 1/24/2007 Justice James C. Nelson, dissenting.I dissent from the Court’s decision on both Issues One and Two. I would remand this case to the District Court, instructing the court to hold a speedy trial hearing with Lewis being represented by constitutionally effective counsel.“ ‘A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty.’ ” Tiedemann, 178 Mont. at 400, 584 P.2d at 1288 (emphasis added) (quoting Barker, 407 16

Had counsel filed such a motion, he had everything to gain for his client and nothing to lose; there was no plausible strategic or tactical advantage to be gained from not filing a no-risk motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial.Under either Issue One or Issue Two, Lewis is entitled to have this cause remanded to the District Court for a hearing putting the prosecution to its burden to prove that the 404 days of delay attributable to the State did not prejudice Lewis’s constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial.I dissent from our contrary resolution of this appeal

./S/ JAMES C. NELSON

Justice Patricia O. Cotter joins in the dissent of Justice James C. Nelson./S/ PATRICIA COTTER

Stare decisis

No. 05-178 State v. RAMON KOTWICKI,2007 MT 17 Justice James C. Nelson, concurring in part and dissenting in part.¶24 I agree with the Court that the threshold question before us is whether Kotwicki has raised “a plausible allegation that his sentence is illegal” under State v. Lenihan, 184 Mont. 338, 602 P.2d 997 (1979). See Opinion, ¶ 18. However, I disagree with the Court’s ultimate answer to this question. If we were to adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis and to our recent decision in State v. Garrymore, 2006 MT 245, 334 Mont. 1, 145 P.3d 946, we would reach the merits of Kotwicki’s sentencing claim. Unfortunately, the Court embarks on a new course that rests on erroneous interpretations of our Lenihan cases and conflicts with our decision in Garrymore, thereby creating further confusion and unpredictability in our Lenihan jurisprudence. I therefore dissent from the Court’s decision. Because Kotwicki alleges that the District Court lacked statutory authority to impose the $25,000 fine because it failed to make the ability-to-pay determination required by § 46-18-231(3), MCA, he has raised a plausible allegation that his sentence is illegal and he may obtain review of his sentencing claim on appeal. Justice James C. Nelson, concurring in part and dissenting in part.