DA 07-0120
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2008 MT 344
STATE OF MONTANA, v. RANDY ALLEN DENNISON,
1. Did the District Court exceed its sentencing authority by imposing conditions on Dennison’s parole?
2. Did the District Court err by imposing a total fine of $28,850 against Dennison?
Pursuant to § 46-18-403(2), MCA, a person may be granted credit on a fine for each day of incarceration prior to conviction, except that the amount credited may not exceed the amount of the fine. Here, neither the $27,750 credit given by the District Court nor the 555 days of time served at $50 per day upon which it was based is challenged on appeal.
¶22 Remanded with instructions that the District Court enter an amended judgment deleting all reference to conditions of parole and reinstating its 2006 total fine of $9,200, less credit for time served, for a net fine of $0.
Wednesday, October 29, 2008
Santobello error, misdemeanor assualt and negligent endangerment
DA 07-0668
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2008 MT 357
STATE OF MONTANA, v. JOSEPH SMIETANKA,
Joseph Smietanka (Smietanka) appeals from the judgment entered by the Fifth Judicial District Court, Jefferson County on his conviction and sentence for the misdemeanor offenses of assault and negligent endangerment. We reverse and remand for resentencing.
A prosecutor’s violation of a plea agreement is unacceptable, even when made inadvertently in a good faith pursuit of a just outcome. Bartosh, ¶ 19.
¶14 Here, the State concedes that the prosecutor’s recommendation of a 12-month suspended sentence on the negligent endangerment offense violated the plea agreement. We hold, therefore, that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by recommending imposition of a sentence in excess of that which the prosecutor had agreed to recommend.
¶15 Reversed and remanded to the District Court for resentencing.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2008 MT 357
STATE OF MONTANA, v. JOSEPH SMIETANKA,
Joseph Smietanka (Smietanka) appeals from the judgment entered by the Fifth Judicial District Court, Jefferson County on his conviction and sentence for the misdemeanor offenses of assault and negligent endangerment. We reverse and remand for resentencing.
A prosecutor’s violation of a plea agreement is unacceptable, even when made inadvertently in a good faith pursuit of a just outcome. Bartosh, ¶ 19.
¶14 Here, the State concedes that the prosecutor’s recommendation of a 12-month suspended sentence on the negligent endangerment offense violated the plea agreement. We hold, therefore, that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by recommending imposition of a sentence in excess of that which the prosecutor had agreed to recommend.
¶15 Reversed and remanded to the District Court for resentencing.
Insufficent evidence, liability insurance, Driving with no proof of insurance
DA 07-0204
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2008 MT 354
STATE OF MONTANA, v. ROBERT G. FARMER
The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in denying Farmer’s motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence § 61-6-301, MCA,
We conclude the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Farmer did not have valid liability insurance for his vehicle at the time of the traffic stop. Consequently, we further conclude the State failed to prove Farmer violated § 61-6-301, MCA. We hold, therefore, that the District Court erred in denying Farmer’s motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence.
¶16 Reversed and remanded to the District Court with instructions to vacate the judgment and dismiss the charge.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2008 MT 354
STATE OF MONTANA, v. ROBERT G. FARMER
The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in denying Farmer’s motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence § 61-6-301, MCA,
We conclude the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Farmer did not have valid liability insurance for his vehicle at the time of the traffic stop. Consequently, we further conclude the State failed to prove Farmer violated § 61-6-301, MCA. We hold, therefore, that the District Court erred in denying Farmer’s motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence.
¶16 Reversed and remanded to the District Court with instructions to vacate the judgment and dismiss the charge.
Condition No. 10 also exceeds the District Court’s sentencing authority, and insofar as it denies Nelson the right and privilege to use medical mariju
DA 07-0339
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2008 MT 359
STATE OF MONTANA,
v.
TIMOTHY SCOTT NELSON,
Timothy Scott Nelson (Nelson) appeals two sentencing conditions imposed on him in the District Court of the Ninth Judicial District Court, Pondera County. We reverse the imposition of the challenged sentencing conditions and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion
Issue One: Did the District Court exceed its statutory authority by requiring Nelson to comply with Condition No. 10 during the term of his deferred sentence?
Did the District Court exceed its authority when it imposed Condition No. 9 and required Nelson to comply with federal law which prohibits the possession of marijuana and does not provide an exception for the use of medical marijuana pursuant to state law?
We conclude the District Court exceeded its authority by requiring Nelson to comply with Condition No. 9, insofar as it subjected him to the possibility that his deferred sentence could be revoked based upon a violation of federal law. While Nelson may be generally required to obey federal law, an exception must be made for lawful use of medical marijuana under the MMA. Condition No. 10 also exceeds the District Court’s sentencing authority, and insofar as it denies Nelson the right and privilege to use medical marijuana as contemplated by the MMA, it must be stricken as well. Therefore, we reverse the imposition of these two conditions and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2008 MT 359
STATE OF MONTANA,
v.
TIMOTHY SCOTT NELSON,
Timothy Scott Nelson (Nelson) appeals two sentencing conditions imposed on him in the District Court of the Ninth Judicial District Court, Pondera County. We reverse the imposition of the challenged sentencing conditions and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion
Issue One: Did the District Court exceed its statutory authority by requiring Nelson to comply with Condition No. 10 during the term of his deferred sentence?
Did the District Court exceed its authority when it imposed Condition No. 9 and required Nelson to comply with federal law which prohibits the possession of marijuana and does not provide an exception for the use of medical marijuana pursuant to state law?
We conclude the District Court exceeded its authority by requiring Nelson to comply with Condition No. 9, insofar as it subjected him to the possibility that his deferred sentence could be revoked based upon a violation of federal law. While Nelson may be generally required to obey federal law, an exception must be made for lawful use of medical marijuana under the MMA. Condition No. 10 also exceeds the District Court’s sentencing authority, and insofar as it denies Nelson the right and privilege to use medical marijuana as contemplated by the MMA, it must be stricken as well. Therefore, we reverse the imposition of these two conditions and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
Friday, October 17, 2008
1 year time limit on misdemeanor prosecution 45-1-205
No. 02-620
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2004 MT 159
KENNETH DEXTER,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
JACK SHIELDS, Justice of the Peace
and JOHN DOE, Sheriff of Fergus County,
Kenneth Dexter (Dexter) was sentenced to one year in jail for third offense DUI. His
sentence was suspended upon condition that he serve ninety days and pay a fine. He failed
to do either. Approximately three years later, he was arrested on an outstanding warrant
issued after his suspended sentence had expired. Presiding Justice of the Peace Jack Shields
(Shields) invoked his contempt of court powers and sentenced Dexter to jail for failing to
fulfill the conditions of his suspended sentence. Dexter filed an application for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus in the Montana Tenth Judicial District Court, Fergus County. The District
Court released Dexter pending a hearing on his application. The District Court subsequently
concluded, however, that Shields had the authority to find Dexter in contempt of court and
to punish Dexter accordingly. Dexter appeals. We reverse.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2004 MT 159
KENNETH DEXTER,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
JACK SHIELDS, Justice of the Peace
and JOHN DOE, Sheriff of Fergus County,
Kenneth Dexter (Dexter) was sentenced to one year in jail for third offense DUI. His
sentence was suspended upon condition that he serve ninety days and pay a fine. He failed
to do either. Approximately three years later, he was arrested on an outstanding warrant
issued after his suspended sentence had expired. Presiding Justice of the Peace Jack Shields
(Shields) invoked his contempt of court powers and sentenced Dexter to jail for failing to
fulfill the conditions of his suspended sentence. Dexter filed an application for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus in the Montana Tenth Judicial District Court, Fergus County. The District
Court released Dexter pending a hearing on his application. The District Court subsequently
concluded, however, that Shields had the authority to find Dexter in contempt of court and
to punish Dexter accordingly. Dexter appeals. We reverse.
05-496
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2008 MT 338
STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. DENNIS EUGENE WEST,
West now appeals, contending that the nearly 26-month delay in bringing him before the District Court on the alleged violation constituted “unnecessary delay” under § 46-18-203(4), MCA, and infringed his rights to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 17 of the Montana Constitution.
We conclude that revoking West’s suspended sentence notwithstanding the 26-month delay in bringing him before the District Court implicates his due process rights. However, we have determined that the factual record presently before this Court is not adequate for deciding this claim on the merits. Accordingly, we set out the relevant legal principles in this Opinion and then remand the case to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2008 MT 338
STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. DENNIS EUGENE WEST,
West now appeals, contending that the nearly 26-month delay in bringing him before the District Court on the alleged violation constituted “unnecessary delay” under § 46-18-203(4), MCA, and infringed his rights to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 17 of the Montana Constitution.
We conclude that revoking West’s suspended sentence notwithstanding the 26-month delay in bringing him before the District Court implicates his due process rights. However, we have determined that the factual record presently before this Court is not adequate for deciding this claim on the merits. Accordingly, we set out the relevant legal principles in this Opinion and then remand the case to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
Wednesday, October 15, 2008
official misconduct, statute of limitations
91-435
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1992
STATE OF MONTANA,
-vs-
MONA LORRAINE HAMILTON,
The issue is whether the official misconduct charges brought
against Hamilton were based on a continuing course of conduct so
that they were not barred by the one-year statute of limitation for
misdemeanors.
We hold that the charges against Hamilton are subject to the
general one-year statute of limitation for misdemeanor offenses.
Assuming the truth of the allegations in the information
against Hamilton and the affidavit upon which it is based, every
element of each offense in Counts IV, VII, and IX occurred more
than one year prior to the filing of the information. The order of
the District Court dismissing Counts IV, VII, and IX is therefore
affirmed
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1992
STATE OF MONTANA,
-vs-
MONA LORRAINE HAMILTON,
The issue is whether the official misconduct charges brought
against Hamilton were based on a continuing course of conduct so
that they were not barred by the one-year statute of limitation for
misdemeanors.
We hold that the charges against Hamilton are subject to the
general one-year statute of limitation for misdemeanor offenses.
Assuming the truth of the allegations in the information
against Hamilton and the affidavit upon which it is based, every
element of each offense in Counts IV, VII, and IX occurred more
than one year prior to the filing of the information. The order of
the District Court dismissing Counts IV, VII, and IX is therefore
affirmed
45-6-30 MCA, statute of limitations and theft
94-313
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1994
STATE OF MONTANA,
CLINTON MULLIN, JR., a/k/a . .
CLINT MULLIN, JR.,
The issue on appeal is:
Did the District Court err when it concluded that felony theft
was not continuous conduct for purposes of applying the statute of
limitations?
To accept the construction of § 45-6-301, MCA, suggested by
the State would be to hold, in effect, that there is no statute of
limitations applicable to the crime of theft unless the stolen
property is abandoned. We decline to do so. Such an extreme
departure from the plain language of our statute of limitations
found at § 45-1-205 (2) (a) , MCA, is better left to the Legislature.
We conclude that the District Court was correct in its
interpretation of the law.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1994
STATE OF MONTANA,
CLINTON MULLIN, JR., a/k/a . .
CLINT MULLIN, JR.,
The issue on appeal is:
Did the District Court err when it concluded that felony theft
was not continuous conduct for purposes of applying the statute of
limitations?
To accept the construction of § 45-6-301, MCA, suggested by
the State would be to hold, in effect, that there is no statute of
limitations applicable to the crime of theft unless the stolen
property is abandoned. We decline to do so. Such an extreme
departure from the plain language of our statute of limitations
found at § 45-1-205 (2) (a) , MCA, is better left to the Legislature.
We conclude that the District Court was correct in its
interpretation of the law.
No jurisdiction for offense on Indian Reservation
No. 99-356
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2000 MT 152
300 Mont. 115
4 P. 3d 1
STATE OF MONTANA
STATE OF MONTANA,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
JESSE EAGLE SPEAKER,
Whether the District Court erred in dismissing the Information for lack of jurisdiction?
We conclude that the offense of theft occurs for jurisdictional purposes where the
elements of that offense take place. From the Information and supporting affidavit, it is
clear that the State has alleged that Eagle Speaker exerted unauthorized control with the
intent to deprive within the exterior boundaries of the Blackfeet Reservation. Accordingly,
because Eagle Speaker allegedly committed theft on the Blackfeet Reservation, the
District Court was without jurisdiction to hear the State's charges.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2000 MT 152
300 Mont. 115
4 P. 3d 1
STATE OF MONTANA
STATE OF MONTANA,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
JESSE EAGLE SPEAKER,
Whether the District Court erred in dismissing the Information for lack of jurisdiction?
We conclude that the offense of theft occurs for jurisdictional purposes where the
elements of that offense take place. From the Information and supporting affidavit, it is
clear that the State has alleged that Eagle Speaker exerted unauthorized control with the
intent to deprive within the exterior boundaries of the Blackfeet Reservation. Accordingly,
because Eagle Speaker allegedly committed theft on the Blackfeet Reservation, the
District Court was without jurisdiction to hear the State's charges.
Felony assualt insufficiency of evidence
No. 96-236
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1998 MT 138
STATE OF MONTANA,
Although Cochran raises several issues on appeal, we address only one, which is
dispositive of this case: did the District Court abuse its discretion when it denied
Cochran’s motion for a directed verdict.
We conclude that the evidence presented was not sufficient to establish that it was Cochran who assaulted Jackson. Accordingly, we hold that the District Court abused its discretion when it failed to direct a verdict in favor of Cochran and dismiss the case. Cochran’s conviction for felony assault is reversed and her sentence is vacated.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1998 MT 138
STATE OF MONTANA,
Although Cochran raises several issues on appeal, we address only one, which is
dispositive of this case: did the District Court abuse its discretion when it denied
Cochran’s motion for a directed verdict.
We conclude that the evidence presented was not sufficient to establish that it was Cochran who assaulted Jackson. Accordingly, we hold that the District Court abused its discretion when it failed to direct a verdict in favor of Cochran and dismiss the case. Cochran’s conviction for felony assault is reversed and her sentence is vacated.
Thursday, October 09, 2008
Entrapment
NO. 79-63
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1980
THE STATE OF MONTANA
VS
ROBERT A. KAMRUD
Appellant presents several issues on appeal but we need consider only one: Did the District Court err in denying defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss on the grounds that entrapment was established as a matter of law? While the defendant may well have had the intent to possess marijuana, the idea for him to sell it or to give it away certainly originated with the police officers and not with defendant. Therefore, we hold that under these facts, entrapment was established as a matter of law. The judgment of the District Court is reversed with directions to dismiss the information.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1980
THE STATE OF MONTANA
VS
ROBERT A. KAMRUD
Appellant presents several issues on appeal but we need consider only one: Did the District Court err in denying defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss on the grounds that entrapment was established as a matter of law? While the defendant may well have had the intent to possess marijuana, the idea for him to sell it or to give it away certainly originated with the police officers and not with defendant. Therefore, we hold that under these facts, entrapment was established as a matter of law. The judgment of the District Court is reversed with directions to dismiss the information.
Tuesday, October 07, 2008
Santobello error at revocation hearing
DA 07-0744
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2008 MT 331
STATE OF MONTANA,
Did the Hill County District Court err in denying Jones’s motion to withdraw his admissions to the revocation petition?
Jones believed that “the State”—whether it was operating in Hill or Silver Bow County—would be bound by the plea agreement and judgment in Silver Bow County. Because this promise was unenforceable, and later on turned out to be unfulfilled, Jones’s admissions to the Hill County revocation petition were involuntary.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2008 MT 331
STATE OF MONTANA,
Did the Hill County District Court err in denying Jones’s motion to withdraw his admissions to the revocation petition?
Jones believed that “the State”—whether it was operating in Hill or Silver Bow County—would be bound by the plea agreement and judgment in Silver Bow County. Because this promise was unenforceable, and later on turned out to be unfulfilled, Jones’s admissions to the Hill County revocation petition were involuntary.
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